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ABSTRACT
Many machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. An
adversarial perturbation modifies an input to change a classifier’s prediction with-
out causing the input to seem substantially different to human perception. We
deploy three methods to detect adversarial images. Adversaries trying to bypass
our detectors must make the adversarial image less pathological or they will fail
trying. Our best detection method reveals that adversarial images place abnormal
emphasis on the lower-ranked principal components from PCA. Other detectors
and a colorful saliency map are in an appendix.
1 INTRODUCTION
Images can undergo slight yet pathological modifications causing machine learning systems to mis-
classify, all while humans barely can notice these perturbations. These types of manipulated images
are adversarial images (Goodfellow et al., 2015), and their existence demonstrates frailties in ma-
chine learning classifiers and a disconnect between human and computer vision.
This unexpected divide can allow attackers complete leverage over some deep learning systems. For
example, adversarial images could cause a deep learning classifier to mistake handwritten digits,
thereby fooling the classifier to misread the amount on a check (Papernot et al., 2016b; Kurakin
et al., 2016). Other fooling data could evade malware detectors or spam filters that use a deep
learning backend (Grosse et al., 2016). Worse, generating adversarial images requires no exact
knowledge of the deep learning system in use, allowing attackers to achieve consistent control over
various classification systems (Szegedy et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2016a).
In this paper, we make progress on detecting adversarial images, and we contribute a new saliency
map to make network classification decisions more understandable. We start by presenting our
first detection method which reveals that adversarial images place abnormally strong emphasis on
principal components which account for little variance in the data. Our second methods uses the
observation from Hendrycks & Gimpel (2017), which states that correctly classified and many out-
of-distribution examples tend to have different softmax distributions, but now we apply this to ad-
versarial images. For our third detection method, we show that adversarial image reconstructions
can be worse than clean image reconstructions if the decoder uses classification information. At-
tempts by an adversary to bypass our detector either fails or compels the adversary to make larger
modifications to a clean image.
2 DETECTING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES
2.1 PCA WHITENING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES
We now show the first of three adversarial image detection methods. For the first detector, we need
to PCA whiten or “sphere” an input. To do this, we must center the training data about zero, compute
the covariance matrix C of the centered data, and find the SVD of C which is C = UΣV T. We can
perform PCA whitening by taking an input example x and computing Σ−1/2UTx, giving us the PCA
whitened input. This whitened vector has as its first entry a coefficient for an eigenvector/principal
∗Work done while the author was at TTIC. Code available at github.com/hendrycks/fooling
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component of C with the largest eigenvalue. Later entries are coefficients for eigenvectors with
smaller eigenvalues. Adversarial images have different coefficients for low-ranked principal com-
ponents than do clean images.
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Figure 1: Adversarial images abnormally emphasize coefficients for low-ranked principal compo-
nents. Each plot corresponds to coefficients for a randomly chosen clean and adversarial image pair.
For concreteness, the 100th “Principal Component” Coefficient is the 100th entry of Σ−1/2UTx for
an input image x. Examples are randomly chosen.
Adversarial image coefficients for later principal components have consistently greater variance as
shown in Figure 1. In fact, we use coefficient variance as our sole feature for detecting adversarial
images. For this experiment, we try using variance to detect whether Tiny-ImageNet, CIFAR-10,
and MNIST images had adversarial perturbations applied. To reduce the chance of bugs in this
experiment, we used a pretrained Tiny-ImageNet classifier and a popular, pre-existing adversarial
image generator from github (Voss, 2015) in addition to our own implementation of an adversarial
image generator for CIFAR-10 and MNIST. In the case of Tiny-ImageNet test set images, each
pixel is in the range [0, 255] before we subtract the mean. For these images, we create fast gradient
sign (step size is 10) and iteratively generated (step size is 1) adversarial images. For CIFAR-10
and MNIST test set images, the fast gradient sign adversarial images have a step size of 10/255
and the iteratively generated images use a step size of 1/255, all while having an `2 regularization
strength of λ = 10−3. These step sizes are small since the data domain has width 1 instead of
255. All adversarial examples are clipped after each descent step so as to ensure that adversarial
perturbations are within normal image bounds. Finally, we keep the adversarial image only if the
softmax prediction probability is above 50% for its randomly chosen target class. Now, we compute
2
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Figure 2: ZCA whitened adversarial images are often visibly distinct from whitened clean images.
Dataset Fast Gradient
Sign AUROC
Fast Gradient
Sign AUPR
Iterative
AUROC
Iterative
AUPR
Tiny-ImageNet 100.0 100.0 92.4 93.5
CIFAR-10 100.0 100.0 92.8 91.2
MNIST 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 1: Variance of entries for whitened adversarial images and whitened clean images differ
enough to allow reliable detection. Baseline values are 50%, and “perfect” detectors correspond
to 100%. All entries are percentages.
detector values by computing the variance of the coefficients for clean and adversarial images. These
variance values are from a subsection of each whitened input. Specifically, we select the 10000th to
final entry of a PCA whitened Tiny-ImageNet input and compute one variance value from this vector
subsection. For each CIFAR-10 whitened image, we compute the variance of entries starting at the
2500th entry. For MNIST, we compute the variance of the entries starting at the 700th position. The
variances are frequently larger for adversarial images generated with fast gradient sign and iterative
methods, as demonstrated in Table 1.
We can also try making adversarial images have typical variances, but this seems to fail. In the
case of fast gradient sign adversarial images, each image is generated after one large step, the
image’s coefficient variance explodes with this one large modification. To see this consider the
aforementioned coefficient subsections for whitened Tiny-ImageNet, CIFAR-10, and MNIST ex-
amples. All fast gradient sign adversarial images have their coefficient variance beyond ten standard
deviations from the mean coefficient variance for clean images. Remarkably in the case MNIST,
100% of fast gradient sign images have their coefficient’s variance beyond 10 billion standard
deviations from the mean coefficient variance of clean images. Similarly, iteratively generated
adversarial images fail to obtain typical variances. For MNIST, we repeat the iterative genera-
tion procedure described earlier but we bound the search procedure. To show how we bound the
search, we establish notation. Let vexample = Var((Σ−1/2UTxexample)700:784), where 700 : 784
is an array subsection from the 700th to final entry. The clean examples clean1, clean2, . . . have
each have the variances vclean1, vclean2, . . .. These variances have the group standard deviation
σclean = std([vclean1, vclean2, . . .]) and mean µclean = mean([vclean1, . . .]). We desire that our ad-
versarial example has its coefficient variance vadversarial within one standard deviation σclean of the
mean coefficient variance for clean examples µclean. This requirement is established by adding the
logarithmic barriers− log(µclean +σclean−vadversarial) and− log(vadversarial−µclean +σclean) to the loss.
Under these constraints, the search procedure could not generate any adversarial MNIST digit. We
did not try converting these constraints for Tiny-ImageNet because the popular codebase taken from
github is substantially different from mainstream libraries. However, if we convert these constraints
for CIFAR-10 images, then 92% of the randomly chosen clean images could not be converted to
an adversarial image with satisfactory coefficient variance. In all, encouraging typical coefficient
variances appears difficult for fast gradient sign and iterative adversarial images.
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A DETECTOR EVALUATION
To justify our three methods for detecting adversarial images, we need to establish our detector
evaluation metrics. For detection we have two classes, and the detector outputs a score for both
the positive (adversarial) and negative (clean) class. In order to evaluate our detectors, we do not
report detection accuracy since accuracy is threshold-dependent, and a chosen threshold should vary
depending on a practitioner’s trade-off between false negatives (fn) and false positives (fp).
Faced with this issue, we employ the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AU-
ROC) metric, which is a threshold-independent performance evaluation (Davis & Goadrich, 2006).
The ROC curve is a graph showing the true positive rate (tpr = tp/(tp + fn)) and the false positive
rate (fpr = fp/(fp + tn)) against each other. Moreover, the AUROC can be interpreted as the proba-
bility that an adversarial example has a greater detector score/value than a clean example (Fawcett,
2005). Consequently, a random positive example detector corresponds to a 50% AUROC, and a
“perfect” classifier corresponds to 100%.1
The AUROC sidesteps the issue of selecting a threshold, as does the Area Under the Precision-
Recall curve (AUPR) which is sometimes deemed more informative (Manning & Schu¨tze, 1999).
One reason is that the AUROC is not ideal when the positive class and negative class have greatly
differing base rates, which can happen in practice. The PR curve plots the precision (tp/(tp+fp)) and
recall (tp/(tp + fn)) against each other. The baseline detector has an AUPR equal to the precision
(Saito & Rehmsmeier, 2015), and a “perfect” classifier has an AUPR of 100%. To show how a
classifier behaves with respect to precision and recall, we also show the AUPR.
B ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS
B.1 SOFTMAX DISTRIBUTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL IMAGES
Hendrycks & Gimpel (2017) show that many out-of-distribution examples tend to have different
softmax output vectors than in-distribution examples. For example, in-distribution examples tend to
have a greater maximum probability than softmax vectors for out-of-distribution examples. Simi-
larly, the KL divergence of the softmax distribution p from the uniform distribution u is larger for
clean examples than for out-of-distribution examples. Therefore, adversarial examples which stop
being modified when the predicted class probability is around 50% are often easily distinguishable
from clean examples since the maximum softmax probability for clean examples tend to be larger
than 50% across many tasks. We can easily detect whether an image is adversarial by considering
the resulting softmax distribution for adversarial images.
Softmax distributions metrics can be gamed, but when this is done the adversarial image becomes
less pathological. To show this, we create an adversarial image with a softmax distribution similar
to those of clean examples by constraining the adversarial image generation procedure. In this
experiment, we take correctly classified CIFAR-10 test images and calculate the standard deviation
of the KL divergence of the softmax output distribution p from the uniform distribution u over 10
elements (σKL[p‖u]). We create an adversarial image iteratively, taking a step size of 1/255 with
a regularization strength of λ = 10−3 and clipping the image after each step. We then bound the
search procedure with a radius r proportional to σKL[p‖u] about the mean KL divergence of p from
u (µKL[p‖u]). This bounding is accomplished by adding logarithmic barriers to the loss. With these
bounds, the generator must construct an adversarial image within 1000 steps and with a typical KL
divergence. If it succeeds, we have a “Creation Success.” In Table 2, we observe that constraining
the search procedure with finite radii greatly increases the `2 distance. Therefore, to get a typical
softmax distribution, the adversarial image quality must decline.
B.2 RECONSTRUCTING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES WITH LOGITS
Our final detection method comes from comparing inputs and their reconstructions. For this experi-
ment, we train an MNIST classifier and attach an auxiliary decoder to reconstruct the input. Auxil-
iary decoders are sometimes known to increase classification performance (Zhang et al., 2016). We
1A debatable, imprecise interpretation of AUROC values may be as follows: 90%—100%: Excellent,
80%—90%: Good, 70%—80%: Fair, 60%—70%: Poor, 50%—60%: Fail.
6
Workshop track - ICLR 2017
Distance from mean
KL-Div
`1 `2 `∞ Creation
Success
r =∞ 23.4 0.43 0.081 100%
r = σKL[p‖u] 32.3 1.38 0.103 83%
r = 12σKL[p‖u] 30.9 1.08 0.101 63%
r = 14σKL[p‖u] 44.2 2.82 0.153 70%
Table 2: Constraints degrade the pathology of fooling images. Value σ is a standard deviation.
Clean
Clean
Recon. Adversarial
Adversarial
Recon.
Figure 3: Adversarial image reconstructions are of lower quality than clean image reconstructions.
use a hidden layer size of 256, the Adam Optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2015) with suggested parame-
ters, and the GELU nonlinearity (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016). The autoencoder bottleneck has only
10 neurons. Crucially, we also feed the logits, viz. the input to a softmax, into the bottleneck layer.
After training, we create adversarial images by an iterative procedure like before, except that we
increase the `2 regularization strength 1000-fold to λ = 1. Now, as evident in Figure 3, the recon-
structions for adversarial images look atypical. From this observation, we build our final detector.
The detector’s input score is the mean difference of the input image and its reconstruction. This
difference is greater between adversarial images and their reconstruction than for clean examples,
so we can detect an adversarial example from a clean example with an AUROC of 96.2% and an
AUPR of 96.6% where the baseline values are 50%. Thus the differences between inputs and their
reconstructions can allow for adversarial image detection.
C A SALIENCY MAP
Let us now stop considering adversarial images and turn to a different AI Safety goal. This goal is
to make neural networks more interpretable. A common way to understand network classifications
is through saliency maps. And a simple way to make a saliency map (Zeiler & Fergus, 2014) is
by computing the gradient of the network’s logits with respect to the input and backpropagating the
error signal without modifying the weights. Then after the error signal traversed backward through
the network, we can display the resulting gradient as an image, and this shows us salient parts of
the image. A recently proposed technique to improve saliency maps is guided backpropagation
Springenberg et al. (2015). To understand guided backpropagation, let us establish some notation.
Let f l+1i = ReLU(xi) = max(0, xi) and R
l+1
i = ∂f
output/∂f l+1i . Now while normally in training
we let Rli = (f
l
i > 0)R
l+1
i , in guided backpropagation we let R
l
i = (f
l
i > 0)(R
l+1
i > 0)R
l+1
i . We
can improve the resulting saliency map significantly if we instead let Rli = (f
l
i > 0)(R
l+1
i > 0),
leading to our saliency map.2
We demonstrate the results in Figure 4 using a pretrained VGG-16 model (Dieleman et al., 2015;
Simonyan & Zisserman, 2015). The positive saliency map consists of the positive gradient values.
In the first column, the network classifies this desert scene as a lakeside. Our saliency map reveals
that coloring the clouds bluer would increase the logits, as would making the sunlit sky more orange.
2Note that this technique works for other nonlinearities as well. For example, if we use a Gaussian Error
Linear Unit and have gl+1i = GELU(xi), then letting R
l
i = g
′(xi)g′(Rl+1i ) produces similar saliency maps.
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Figure 4: Our saliency map reveals more saliency details than guided backprogagation.
From this we can surmise that the clouds serve as the lakeside water, and the sky the shore. Next,
the fish construed as a water snake has a saliency map where the background resembles water, and
the fish’s scales are greener and more articulated like a water snake. Also with our saliency map,
we can see that some white regions of the fish become orange which would increase the logits.
Meanwhile, guided backpropagation shows the fish’s eye. Last, our saliency map makes it evident
that a bluer sky contrasting with a darker lower region would further increase the logits, suggesting
the blue sky’s role in the image’s seashore misclassification. Overall, this new saliency map allows
for visualizing clearer sources of saliency.
D DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although we showed some diverse detectors, future ad-hoc attacks may completely bypass each
of these. Indeed, the softmax distribution detector can already be bypassed. But as we saw the
adversarial image must contort itself to evade the detector and therefore reduce its level of pathology.
We can extend this idea and conclude there may be a better line of attack for stopping adversarial
images. Instead of seeking one statistic or one architecture trick to blockade all adversarial attacks,
one might use a combination of detectors to more effectively lessen an image’s ability to fool. Any
narrow metric can be gamed, but this is not necessarily so for an ensemble of several strong but
imperfect predictors. Therefore, a different avenue to attack adversarial images is by amassing
a combination of detectors. These can safeguard against adversarial images by forcing the
adversarial perturbation to be more and more conspicuous.
In this work, we showcased techniques for detecting adversarial images and visualizing salient re-
gions of an image. Future research could add onto this new body of detectors since an ensemble
of detectors may be a feasible avenue for defending against adversarial images. A possible future
detector could use attention. Say that an adversarial image made a picture of a street classified as a
8
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war tank. Since adversarial image attacks seem not to be localized (Luo et al., 2015), the attention
map for the tank’s gun turret may be scattered or uniform across the image and thus abnormal and
detectable. Other work could be in effective but nearly harmless preprocessing to hinder adversarial
perturbations. For example, a preliminary experiment of ours shows that if a CIFAR-10 image is in
[0,1], we can square the pixels, apply a slight Gaussian blur, take the square root of the result, and
the image often no longer tricks the network allowing us to detect an adversarial attack. If the ad-
versarial generator anticipates this preprocessing through more optimization, the `2 norm of the new
adversarial image must increase 35% on average. This and other preprocessing techniques could be
studied further to add onto an ensemble of defenses. Finally, any general work on out-of-distribution
detection or error detection (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017) may transfer directly to this adversarial
setting. Future research can bear in mind that while adversarial attacks can be invisible to the human
eye, we now know that these perturbations can greatly affect the statistics of the underlying image,
their reconstruction, or their softmax distribution thereby enabling detection.
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